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 Abstract
Processing or cognitive fl uency is the experienced ease of ongoing 
mental processes. This experience infl uences a wide range of judg-
ments and decisions. We present a general model for these fl uency 
effects. Based on Brunswik’s lens-model, we conceptualize fl uency 
as a meta-cognitive cue. For the cue to impact judgments, we 
propose three process steps: people must experience fl uency; the 
experience must be attributed to a judgment-relevant source; and it 
must be interpreted within the judgment context. This interpreta-
tion is either based on available theories about the experience’s 
meaning or on the learned validity of the cue in the given context. 
With these steps the model explains most fl uency effects and 
allows for new and testable predictions. 
 Processing fl uency is the experienced ease of ongoing mental processes; when 
people perceive, process, store, retrieve, and generate information, they experi-
ence the ease or diffi culty of these cognitive operations (cf. Chapter 1). This 
experience has profound infl uences on judgments and decisions: fl uently 
perceived names are judged as famous; fl uently read statements are evaluated as 
true; and fl uently retrieved instances from memory are estimated to be likely and 
frequent. In addition, fl uency is manipulated in many ways: repetition, perceptual 
clarity, font type, priming, rhyming, semantic coherence, and so forth (see 
Chapter 1 for examples, and Alter & Oppenheimer,  2009 , for an overview). The 
scope of these manipulations and effects (which we will discuss in greater detail 
below and the following chapters will add some items to the list) begs three 
important questions: First, is fl uency indeed a unitary construct, or are there 
different and varying explanations for what researchers call “fl uency effects,” 
depending on specifi c manipulations? Second, if fl uency is indeed the theoretical 
construct that explains all these effects, how does fl uency infl uence such a wide 
range of variables? And third, if fl uency is indeed the explanation for these infl u-
ences, why are these effects in the observed direction? Why are fl uently perceived 
names judged as famous instead of non-famous, why are fl uently read statements 
evaluated as true and not false, and why are fl uently retrieved instances from 
memory estimated to be likely and frequent, and not improbable and rare? 
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 While Chapter 1 aimed to introduce the construct and give a sense of what 
processing fl uency is, the present chapter aims to delineate a model of fl uency 
effects that answers these three questions and provides a general framework for 
fl uency effects. And although this will be a “fl uency” model, we believe that 
similar basic parameters as we discuss here apply to thinking experiences or 
cognitive feelings in general, including, for example, the tip-of-the-tongue 
phenomenon (Brown & McNeill,  1966 ; Schwartz,  2002 ), feelings of knowing 
(Hart,  1965 ; Koriat,  1993 ), or the “eureka” experience (Metcalfe & Wiebe,  1987 ; 
Topolinski & Reber,  2010 ). 
 Range of fluency effects 
 In this section, we provide a cursory overview of fl uency effects. This overview 
serves to illustrate the phenomenon’s richness and to motivate a general model, 
guided by the three questions outlined in the introduction. 
 The probably most famous example of fl uency effects in judgments was 
provided by Tversky and Kahneman ( 1973 ). In one experiment, participants 
judged the frequency of English words starting with the letter “r” compared to 
words with “r” in the third position. Although words with “r” in the third position 
are factually more frequent, participants judged words starting with the letter “r” 
to be more frequent. Supposedly this is because words starting with “r” come to 
mind more fl uently and are more fl uently generated. While it seems almost self-
evident to judge frequency by the fl uency with which instances are retrieved from 
memory, other infl uences of fl uency are less intuitive, and many of these infl u-
ences have far-reaching consequences. 
 Besides this classic example how retrieval fl uency infl uences frequency judg-
ments (Tversky & Kahneman;  1973 ), the experience of fl uency infl uences judg-
ments and decisions regarding liking of stimuli (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 
 1998 ), familiarity of names (Whittlesea,  1993 ), fame (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & 
Jasechko,  1989 ), ability of persons (Greifeneder et al.,  2010 ), size and duration 
(Reber, Zimmermann, & Wurtz,  2004 ), truth of statements (Hasher, Goldstein, & 
Toppino,  1977 ), perceptions of fairness (Greifeneder, Müller, Stahlberg, Kees van 
den Bos, & Bless, 2011), the economic value of stocks (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
 2006 ), or the gross value of companies (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 
 2008 ). 
 For instance, Reber and colleagues ( 1998 , Exp. 1) asked participants to judge 
the prettiness of slightly distorted pictures of neutral objects (e.g., a horse or a 
plane). All pictures were preceded by another picture that was only presented for 
25 ms. This “prime” either was the contour outline of the following picture (i.e., 
a matching prime) or of another picture (i.e., a non-matching primes). As previ-
ous exposure facilitates processing (Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo,  1983 ), partici-
pants should process the following picture more fl uently when it is preceded by 
its contour. In line with this argument, participants judged pictures that were 
preceded by matching primes (and were therefore more fl uently perceived) as 
prettier compared to those that were preceded by non-matching primes. 
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 As a second example, consider again Tversky and Kahneman’s ( 1973 ) fi nding 
that people estimate categories frequencies as being higher when instances from 
that frequency come easily to mind. In addition to laboratory results such as the 
letter frequency experiment detailed earlier (see also Greifeneder, Bless, & 
Scholl, this volume), Combs and Slovic ( 1979 ) provided a naturalistic example 
by showing that people grossly overestimated the likelihood of causes of death 
in relation to their availability from newspaper coverage; because these well-
covered causes of death are easily and fl uently available, people overestimate 
their frequency. 
 Finally, consider work by Begg, Anas, and Farinacci ( 1992 ) on the infl uence 
of fl uency on judgments of truth. The authors reported that participants believed 
more in previously presented statements than new ones, even though participants 
could not remember having seen those statements before. Supposedly, this is 
because previous exposure renders later processing of the same stimuli more 
fl uent, and this fl uency is then used in judgments of truth. 
 Again, for a general model to explain these effects, it is necessary that provid-
ing contour outlines of pictures, featuring death-causes in newspapers, and 
encountering statements in previous sessions, infl uences the same psychological 
construct, processing fl uency. We will save this question for the end, but already 
on a mere structural level, the common denominator of these examples is that 
people use the fl uency of their ongoing mental processes (e.g., perceiving, 
retrieving) to judge an otherwise unknown or uncertain property, such as liking, 
frequency, or truth. This structure is at the heart of Brunswik’s lens-model 
( 1952 ), and we will apply this model to the question of how fl uency infl uences 
judgments and decisions. 
 How fluency is used as information in 
judgment—a Brunswikian explanation 
 As stated, the present argument is inspired by Brunswik’s ( 1952 ,  1955 ) lens-
model, which we depict schematically in Figure  2.1 (see Karelaia & Hogarth, 
 2008 , for an overview of lens-model applications in human judgments and deci-
sion making). For the present argument, the most important model feature is the 
distinction in  distal properties of the environment and  proximal cues to infer 
these properties. The lens model assumes that an organism (e.g., a human judge) 
uses proximal cues to infer a distal criterion that is not directly accessible 
(Hammond,  1955 ). A good illustration of these abstract concepts is intelligence; 
it is impossible to see, hear, feel, or assess a person’s intelligence directly; it is a 
distal property. To judge intelligence, people must use available information, that 
is, proximal cues; for example, a person’s performance in an intelligence test or 
her grades in school. None of this information perfectly predicts intelligence, but 
there should be some relation between school grades and intelligence, or between 
intelligence and school grades. Here, we assume that individuals use fl uency in a 
similar way as a proximal cue to form judgments about distal criteria – such as 
liking, frequency, or truth. 
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 The extent to which cues correlate with criteria (e.g., grades with intelligence) 
is referred to as “ecological correlations;” the weight assigned to a specifi c cue 
when forming a judgment is referred to as “cue utilization” (cf. Figure  2.1 ). These 
termini are best illustrated by the example of depth perception. Although humans 
readily experience a visual sense of depth, human eyes are actually not equipped 
to convey visual depth directly. Rather, depth is a distal criterion that people infer 
from proximal visual cues to create three-dimensional representations from the 
two-dimensional pictures on the retinas. Prominent cues in vision to infer depth 
are overlap (objects that hide other objects are closer to the perceiver), motion 
parallax (when perceivers move, objects that are closer seem to move faster than 
far away objects), and texture gradients (distant objects have denser textures than 
close objects). By using these cues and by combining them in a linear weighted 
fashion, people are able to infer depth from strictly two-dimensional sensory input. 
 The principle of “ecological correlations” suggests that cues vary in the extent to 
which they correlate with the criterion. For example, overlap is perfectly correlated 
with the distance of the perceiver to objects: An object overlapping another object 
will always be closer to the perceiver. In contrast, texture gradients are infl uenced 
by factors other than distance, and thus, the cue’s relation to the criterion is proba-
bilistic. And this probabilistic relation is certainly true for school grades and intel-
ligence. Applying this reasoning to fl uency, the ecological correlation is the fl uency 
cue’s validity with respect to the judgmental criterion  (e.g., truth or frequency). 
 The principle of “cue utilization” suggests that people place differential weight 
on specifi c cues when forming judgments. For example, in a moving train, people 
usually weight motion parallax more strongly than texture gradients to judge 
visual depth. Similarly, some people and institutions use test scores as the sole 
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 Figure 2.1  A “lens-model”, illustrating how organism judge distal criteria by proximal cues. 
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cue for intelligence, while others scorn them completely. Applying this reasoning 
to fl uency, cue utilization is the weight judge places on given cues when forming 
judgments in a specifi c situation. This also implies that judges use other available 
information as well (e.g., factual knowledge about truth), and the judgment 
output is a weighted function of the available cues. 
 Ideally, a cue’s ecological correlation (i.e., its validity) determines the cue’s 
utilization (i.e., its weight in a judgment). However, in many cases, ecological 
correlation and cue utilization do not match (Karelaia & Hogarth,  2008 ); for the 
fl uency case, these are the instances when the infl uence of fl uency is rightfully 
termed a bias or an unwanted infl uence; for example, when statements are 
believed because one has heard them before (e.g., Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 
 1992 ), or when stocks are rated higher because their names are easy to pronounce 
(Alter & Oppenheimer,  2006 ). 
 Again, most, if not all, judgments that are infl uenced by fl uency refer to distal 
properties of the environment, such as liking, fame, truth, ability, justice, or 
economic value. And people have no directly available informative about these 
properties—in contrast, for example, to the criterion “temperature,” for which 
people have directly available sensory input. Distal properties defy almost by 
defi nition exact quantifi cations; so people  must infer them from proximal cues. 
We believe that is very helpful to conceptualize fl uency as such a proximal cue 
when modeling the infl uence of fl uency on judgments. We suggests that this 
proximal cue (a) is readily and easily available from ongoing mental processes 
(see Greifeneder, Bless, & Scholl, this volume) and (b) is not a perfect cue but in 
a probabilistic relation with ecological criteria, just as texture gradients are not 
perfect cues for depth perception and school grades are not perfect cues for intel-
ligence. In the following model, we will implement the suggested notion of 
fl uency as a proximal cue in a comprehensive model with three distinct steps: 
experiencing, attributing, and interpreting fl uency. 
 A process model 
 In the introductory passage, we have sketched that fl uency may infl uence a multi-
tude of very different judgments. This is precisely because fl uency is a probabil-
istic cue that people use to judge otherwise inaccessible distal criteria. The 
Brunswikian lens-model presents a formal theoretical framework for this infl u-
ence. In the following, we discuss the necessary process steps for this infl uence. 
People must have a feeling of fl uency or ease (i.e., experiencing fl uency), they 
must identify the proper cause for the feeling (i.e., attributing fl uency), and they 
must infer what the feeling means in the given context (i.e., interpreting fl uency). 
These steps are illustrated in Figure  2.2 and we will explain them in what follows. 
 Experiencing fl uency 
 We start by postulating that people experience the working of ongoing mental 
processes, and that this working is refl ected in feelings of fl uency. Although people 
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have little conscious access to what our mind really does (or does not) when 
performing mental operations such as accessing memory (Nisbett & Wilson, 
 1977 ), people experience the ease or diffi culty of these operations. A parallel 
process is the experience of hunger when blood glucose level is low; albeit the 
level itself is not directly accessible (and hunger may stem from other sources as 
well), the experience itself is readily available. Similarly, feelings of fl uency grant 
a window to otherwise inaccessible processes (Koriat & Levy-Sadot,  1999 ). 
 Two interesting questions directly ensue from this postulate: First, how do 
mental processes translate into perceptions of fl uency? One possible answer is 
that all cognitive processing is continuously monitored, and that the output of this 
monitoring is fl uency (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2000; see also Whittlesea & Price, 
2001; Whittlesea, 2002). Koriat and colleagues (Koriat,  1993 ; Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996) have used the term “parasitic” to describe the effect that cogni-
tive processes cause subjective experiences as by-products. Although describing 
feelings of fl uency as parasitic might carry some negative connotations, it 
captures nicely the fact that the feeling emerges without need for attention or 
resources. The continuous monitoring function seems more problematic in that 
respect, but the analogy of cognitive with biological functions helps to illustrate 
the idea. The human body’s biological systems monitor dozens of homeostatic 
variables such as body temperature, hormone concentrations, heart beat frequency, 
or again, blood glucose levels. These monitoring functions also work without 
attention and awareness. It is not too far-fetched to assume a similar monitoring 
function for cognitive functions. 1 
 The second question pertains to  when fl uency is experienced and infl uences 
judgments and decisions? This question has been thoroughly investigated and we 
believe there is a clear answer: People experience fl uency when there are process-
ing differences compared to what is expected or compared to what has appeared 
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 Figure 2.2  A general process model of fl uency effects in judgments and decisions. 
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previously (Whittlesea & Williams,  1998 ; Hansen & Wänke,  2008 ; Hansen & 
Wänke, this volume). Deviation detection in monitoring is a well-established 
principle: for example, in a series of numbers, the deviating letter will stand out 
and vice versa (e.g., 2-6-7-K-8 vs. K-L-T-4-W). Similarly, unfamiliar names will 
stand out in a series of familiar names and vice versa (e.g., Bach, Beethoven, 
Weisdorf, Mozart vs. Weisdorf, Miller, Beethoven, Brown); or, as Whittlesea and 
Williams ( 1998 ) have argued, people will not detect how fl uently they can 
process the faces of their family members during breakfast, but they will imme-
diately detect the stranger at their table. Likewise, people will detect the deviating 
fl uently processed face of a friend in a crowd of strangers. 
 In biological monitoring processes, people will for example notice when they 
are hungry and they will notice when they have eaten too much. Yet, most of the 
time the stomach does not provide a noticeable experience, although monitoring 
is going on continuously; it is when there are deviations from the norm that an 
experience becomes salient and is noticed. We have incorporated this principle in 
Figure  2.2 , left side. For reasons of illustration, we assume that there are currently 
fi ve cognitive processes going on (e.g., perceiving one stimulus, categorizing 
another stimulus, etc.). Of those fi ve, only Process 2 deviates strongly enough 
from the processing background to be perceived or experienced. For example, 
when the retrieval of a certain memory is particularly easy, this retrieval process 
is noticed. This perceptual process takes place on the “fringe of consciousness” 
(Reber, Wurtz & Zimmermann,  2004 ). 
 It is important that the deviation does not have to between multiple ongoing 
processes, but can also result from expectancies, baselines, or prior experiences. 
Otherwise the model would not predict fl uency effects when there is no variation 
in a given situation—for example, when people are asked to estimate the 
frequency of words having the letter “r” at the third place. Nevertheless, our 
model posits that for the underestimation effect reported by Tversky and 
Kahneman ( 1973 ), the retrieval should be diffi cult to some baseline (e.g., how 
easy/diffi cult is it in general to recall words from memory), to what is expected 
(e.g., are people being told that this is an easy or diffi cult task), or to comparable 
other processes (e.g., how easy/diffi cult is it to recall words from memory  starting 
with the letter “r”). 
 An experimental test that the impact of fl uency depends on processing differ-
ences was provided by Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, and Wänke ( 2009 ). In a fi rst 
experiment, they presented participants with new and repeated statements, 
thereby manipulating how fl uently participants could read these statements. 
Participants’ task was to judge the truth of these statements. As discussed, the 
standard result is that people rate the truth of repeated statements higher compared 
to new statements (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino,  1977 ; Reber & Schwarz, 
 1999 ). To show the importance of processing differences, participants either 
judged mixed lists containing old and new statements (thereby creating fl uency 
differences in statement processing), or lists of only new/only old statements 
(thereby eliminating fl uency differences in processing). The higher rated truth for 
old statements only appeared when the lists were mixed, that is, when there were 
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notable differences in experienced fl uency across the presented statements. In a 
second experiment, the authors showed the same pattern for the greater liking of 
repeated stimuli. When participants judged how much they liked Kanji charac-
ters, they only preferred old stimuli when old and new Kanjis were mixed in a 
list. When participants judged old and new Kanji separately, no fl uency effect on 
liking emerged. 
 Hence, the answer to the question  when people actually experience fl uency (or 
disfl uency) seems indeed to be: The fl uency of mental operation is experienced 
when the associated experience of fl uency deviates markedly (a) from a baseline, 
(b) from what is expected in a given context, or (c) from comparable other 
processes. 
 A supplementary possibility is that fl uency infl uences judgments when atten-
tion is drawn to the experience, for example, when people are asked how they feel 
about something. Just as people can tell that their stomach is full or empty when 
asked for it, they probably can assess whether cognitive processes are going 
fl uently or disfl uently, even when there is no immediate variation. However, in 
most cases, as the experiments by Dechêne and colleagues ( 2009 ) show, the 
experience should have no detectable impact on judgments when fl uency experi-
ences does not vary, for example, between to-be-judged objects. In other words, 
although family members at the breakfast table should be perceived more fl uently 
than a crowd of strangers, judgments about family or strangers should not vary 
within the respective groups (Whittlesea & Williams,  1998 ). 
 Attributing fl uency 
 The second step is that people need to draw an association between a particular 
fl uency experience and a given stimulus for fl uency to be informative about this 
stimulus. Let us illustrate this again with Tversky and Kahneman’s problem of 
word frequency estimation: To judge words with the letter “r” at the third position 
as less frequent, people need to draw an association between the experienced 
disfl uency and the mental process of retrieving the words—and not, for instance, 
an association between disfl uency and background noise or splitting headaches. 
If fl uency is attributed to the mental process of memory retrieval, it is informative 
about the word retrieval task. If fl uency is attributed to background noises or 
headaches, fl uency is not perceived as being caused by the task, and hence, the 
experience is uninformative about the task. 
 We assume that the attribution of feelings and experiences to possible causes 
are determined by salience—a salient cause stands out in some way. In Gestalt-
Psychology terms, a cause is salient when it stands out as a fi gure stands out 
against the background. As this fi gure-ground principle also applies to the devia-
tion idea we have introduced as one of the pre-conditions to experience fl uency, 
it follows that attribution processes will result in the possibly correct ascription 
of fl uency to the relevant mental process. From this, it seems likely that fl uency 
is attributed to the correct cause in most situations (see Greifeneder, Bless, & 
Scholl, this volume). 
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 However, there are classic demonstrations that fl uency is not used in judg-
ments and decision when another source is identifi ed for the fl uency experience. 
Probably the most direct test of this notion was provided by Schwarz and 
colleagues ( 1991 ; but see also the overview by Wänke, this volume). In one 
of their experiments (Experiment 3), people retrieved from memory six or 12 
instances of either assertive or unassertive behaviors. The idea was that it is easy 
to retrieve six but diffi cult to retrieve 12 instances. Based on the fl uency of this 
retrieval process, people should infer that there are few (diffi cult retrieval) or 
many (easy retrieval) instances of these behaviors and judge their own assertive-
ness accordingly. However, when participants were told that the ease/fl uency 
experiences were caused by music in the background, the effects on judgments 
vanished (for a review, see Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011). 
 Interpreting fl uency 
 When people experience fl uency, and the experience is attributed to the ongoing 
mental process, the important last step is to identify the meaning of the experi-
ence. This last step explains why fl uency is able to infl uence judgments of liking, 
frequency, truth, and many other domains. The word frequency estimation task 
again illustrates this point. If retrieving words having “r” as third letter is diffi cult 
and people attribute this diffi culty correctly to the retrieval process, why does it 
follow that these words are rare (in comparison to words starting with “r”)? 
Another interpretation could be that a person’s verbal ability is low. Similarly, if 
people experience that they can read a name fl uently, and they attribute fl uency to 
reading the name, there are several interpretations of the experience. It could be that 
it is a famous name, a frequent name, a recently encountered name, and so forth. 
 How the experience is interpreted is central for the infl uence on judgments. 
In one experiment relevant for this point, Oppenheimer (2004) asked people to 
judge the frequency of surnames. Usually, one would expect that people judge 
more fl uently processed names as more frequent—however, when the names 
were fl uent because they belonged to famous persons (such as Nixon, Bush, or 
Lennon), participants did not use fl uency to form frequency judgments. Rather, 
they even judged these famous names as less frequent compared to non-famous 
names. Thus, people interpreted fl uency as fame, and not as frequency, and 
accordingly, fl uency was discounted as a cue for frequency. 
 Similarly, if people experience memory retrieval as fl uent, fl uent retrieval can 
inform many judgments: Maybe the memory was signifi cant, or it was particu-
larly happy, or particularly painful. The interpretation of the experience deter-
mines the infl uence on subsequent judgments. 
 Direct evidence of interpretation was provided by Mandler, Nakamura, and 
Van Zandt (1987). In their experiment, people had to judge two grey-colored 
geometric shapes. One of the two shapes had been presented previously while the 
other was a new shape. Some participants were asked which of the two shapes 
they liked better. For these participants, a standard fl uency effect emerged: 
participants preferred, on average, previously presented shapes over new shapes. 
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A second group of participants was asked which of the shapes were brighter (or, 
in another condition, darker). Interestingly, these participants also chose the old 
and hence fl uently processed shapes to be lighter (or darker). This pattern of 
results suggests that the same cue—fl uency—may be interpreted very differently 
(here, as indicating liking, brightness, or darkness). 
 The question is then, how do people know the meaning of fl uency? One direct 
answer is that people use fl uency in accordance with the task context—if they are 
asked “how frequent?”, “how famous?”, or “how true?”, more fl uently processed 
names are rated as more frequent, people as more famous, or statements as more 
true, compared to less fl uently processed statements. This is equivalent to stating 
that people notice a difference (e.g., one name is read more fl uently than the 
other) and translate this difference on the available judgment dimension. 
However, this answer is unsatisfactory, because it does not explain the direction 
of the effect. In other words, why do people judge the fl uently processed name as 
more frequent, more famous, and more true, and not  less frequent,  less famous, 
or  less true? 
 There are two ways to solve this important problem. The fi rst is that people 
 learn via feedback the interpretation of fl uency in a given context (cf. Figure  2.2 ). 
This explanation is directly derived from the Brunswikian framework. People 
learn the validity of a cue by feedback from the environment. If a jury member 
believes a testimony that is easily processed, and she gets later feedback that the 
witness was indeed truthful (e.g., due to other evidence), she may learn that 
fl uency is a cue to truth. While this explanation assumes a very basic, perception-
like process, there is a second possibility (also depicted in Figure  2.2 ), involving 
higher cognitive processes, namely that people have naïve theories about the 
meaning of fl uency. This explanation applies to the discussed results by 
Oppenheimer (2004). If people  know that fame leads to fl uent processing, they 
will not interpret fl uency as frequency for famous names. Let us discuss the 
evidence for these two explanations. 
 Feedback learning 
 Again, this explanation follows directly from the Brunswikian framework. The 
analogy is apparent by using the perception example: Why do people use overlap 
in perception to judge distance? First, because haptic feedback from reaching out 
to objects shows a perfect correlation between distance to objects and their 
 overlap—the object hiding the other object is closer. Second, because overlap 
correlates with other cues that indicate distance, that is, motion parallax, pattern 
density, and so forth. We assume that the same feedback-learning and inter-cue 
correlations allow people to use fl uency in judgments: People have  learned that 
categories from which instances are easily retrieved have indeed more members, 
and statements that are easily processed have a higher probability to be factually 
true. This assumption of learned ecological validity also explains why the same 
experience can have such differential infl uences. The fl uency infl uence depends 
on the ecology in which a judgment is made; in experimental tasks, the ecology is 
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often provided by the questions researchers are asking. And the infl uence should 
always be in the direction that people have learned from their experiences. Figure 
 2.2 includes this aspect in the feedback loop from judgments and decisions. 
 Direct evidence for the importance of feedback learning stems from experi-
ments by Unkelbach ( 2006 ,  2007 ). In one experiment (Unkelbach,  2006 , Exp. 1), 
participants indicated in a test phase whether they had seen a name before in a 
presentation phase. Processing fl uency was manipulated by color contrast: low 
contrast names were diffi cult to read and high contrast names were easy to read. 
Importantly, before this test phase, there was a learning phase that conveyed 
correlations between fl uency and recognition. Previously presented names were 
either shown in high contrast (i.e., a positive correlation between fl uency and 
previous occurrence) or in low contrast (i.e., a negative correlation between 
fl uency and previous occurrence). Participants made old-new judgments for each 
name and received feedback about the correctness of their judgment. In other 
words, some participants learned by feedback that fl uent processing indicated that 
a name was new and for others fl uent processing indicated that a name was false. 
In the test phase, the names’ contrast and old-new status were not correlated. 
Nevertheless, given that people had received feedback that fl uent processing indi-
cated that a name was new, they judged the high contrast names as new. When 
they had received feedback that fl uent processing indicated that a name was old, 
they showed the standard pattern and judged the high contrast names old. 
 The same pattern occurred for truth judgments (Unkelbach,  2007 , Exp. 2). 
People learned that high fl uency (due to color contrast) correlates with state-
ments’ falseness, and accordingly, judged in a test phase easy-to-read statements 
as false. For both these experiments, the clear critique is that there is no evidence 
that processing fl uency was actually involved. People could simply have learned 
color contrast as a direct cue to judge the old/new status of a name or the truth of 
a statement. This point was addressed in another experiment (Unkelbach,  2007 , 
Exp. 3; see also Unkelbach,  2006 , Exp. 2). Participants initially saw statements 
in a presentation phase. Then, in a learning phase, they judged the truth of state-
ments that varied in color contrast and accordingly, in processing fl uency. As 
before, there were two conditions: Either high or low fl uency correlated with 
truth and participants received feedback for their judgments. In the test phase, all 
statements were presented in black on white background, but half the statements 
were old and half were new (and this old/new status was orthogonal to factual 
truth). Thus, the statements did not vary in processing fl uency due to color 
contrast, but varied in fl uency due to prior exposure. When high contrast corre-
lated with truth in the training phase, they showed the standard pattern and judged 
old statements as “true” with greater probability. However, when low contrast 
correlated with truth in the training phase, they showed the reversed pattern and 
judged new statements as “true” with greater probability (and old statements as 
“false”; see Olds & Westerman, 2012, for a replication). 
 These data provide good evidence that the interpretation of processing fl uency 
changes depending on the learning history in a given context. In most cases, fl uently 
processed statements are indeed true, simply because the factors infl uencing 
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fl uency also correlate with factual truth (for a complete discussion, see Reber & 
Unkelbach,  2010 ); for example, when people hear a statement from different 
sources, it is processed more fl uently and the probability that it is true increases. 
Similarly, when a statement is consistent with known facts, it is also processed 
more fl uently and also more likely true. And the same holds for other judg-
ments—but the interpretation is not fi xed and the meaning of the experience does 
not come out of the blue. In this explanation, it is the adaptive usage of a cue that 
has been learned via feedback to judge otherwise inaccessible distal criteria. 
 Naïve theories 
 An alternative reason why people use fl uency the way they do are naïve theories 
about the meaning of the experience (Schwarz,  2004 ). Evidence for this theoreti-
cal position stems from experiments that show differential fl uency effects on 
judgments when participants are informed about the meaning of fl uency in this 
context. For example, Winkielman and Schwarz ( 2001 ) had participants retrieve 
four or 12 instances from their childhood. Participants should experience the 
former retrieval process as easy and the latter as diffi cult. Importantly, instruc-
tions provided participants with an interpretation of this experience: Half were told 
that happy memories fade quickly from memory (making them diffi cult to retrieve) 
and half were told that unhappy memories fade quickly. Then, participants judged 
the pleasantness of their childhood. In line with the idea of naïve theories, partici-
pants who were told that happy memories fade quickly and could retrieve memo-
ries easily (four instances) and judged their childhood not as happy as participants 
for whom retrieval was diffi cult (12 instances). However, the reverse pattern 
occurred when participants were told that sad memories fade quickly. 
 Briñol, Petty, and Tormala (2006; see also Briñol, Tormala, & Petty, this volume) 
reported similar effects on attitude judgments when participants were given theories 
that retrieval fl uency is good or bad, that is, standard effects when fl uency had posi-
tive implications and reverse effects when fl uency had negative implications. 
 Disentangling naïve theories and feedback learning 
 These experiments illustrate the importance of naïve theories or lay beliefs for 
fl uency infl uences on judgments. The important difference to the Brunswikian 
learning account is that providing naïve theories does not change the experience 
 per se . People still experience easiness or fl uency, but they use this experience 
differently depending on the provided information. Put differently, with the 
provision of naïve theories, the effect is located in the output stage; in contrast, 
the learning account assumes that the experience takes on a different meaning in 
a given context. The experience immediately means something different. Let us 
illustrate this with an example: Imagine you are reading your fi rst crime mystery 
and all clues so far point to suspect X as the culprit. The provided information 
gives you the distinct feeling that X is guilty. However, you are also  told that 
crime novel authors never give away solutions so easily—rather, they use 
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 obvious “red herrings” to lure you away from the factual and hopefully surprising 
solution. Thus, in the context of the crime novel, when you are asked if you 
believe whether X is guilty, you can judge that X is not guilty,  because you have 
the clear feeling that X is guilty, which makes the person a red herring (and thus, 
not guilty). Yet, if you have read many crime novels and you have learned from 
experience that the obvious solution is never true (and the murderer is never the 
gardener), your feeling will directly tell you that X is not guilty. The effect is not 
located at the output stage of the judgment but rather on the experience stage. 
Thus, naïve theories conceptualize the fl uency experience as input to a metacog-
nitive judgment, while learning approaches conceptualize the fl uency experience 
as a perception-like cue in judgments. 
 On an operational level, the two explanations are also easy to distinguish: 
Naïve theories are communicated in a top-down fashion; for example, partici-
pants are given  a priori explanations about the meaning of their experiences. 
Accordingly, participants should be able to verbalize the theory. Contrary, for 
learning approaches, the meaning of the fl uency experience is communicated in 
a bottom-up fashion, for example, by providing feedback about decisions. 
Participants are not necessarily able to verbalize what they have learned. Further 
on an operational level, for naïve theories, judgments are mostly done on the 
summary of the experiences (e.g., after participants retrieve four instances from 
their childhood). For learned interpretations, the judgments are made immedi-
ately, for example, when perceiving a stimulus or reading a statement (Reber 
et al.,  1998 ; Unkelbach,  2006 ). 
 Yet, the explanations of naïve theories and learning are not in competition, 
they rather complement each other. This is the reason why Figure  2.2 features 
only one process—interpretation—that can be informed either by naïve theories 
or feedback learning. One can construe naïve theories as consciously available 
rules about correlations between fl uency and a criterion. In our crime novels 
example, the experienced reader does not only have the feeling that X is not 
guilty, but also the available theory that authors use red herrings. Conversely, one 
can see theories and beliefs about a correlation as the enabling conditions for 
successfully learning of given fl uency correlations. As recent research on learn-
ing and conditioning shows, successful learning depends not only on the environ-
ments’ stimulus-relations, but also on attention, awareness, and goals on the 
learner’s side (e.g., Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond,  2009 ; Shanks,  2010 ). By 
acknowledging both the bottom-up component (i.e., learning) as well as the 
 top-down component (i.e., theories and beliefs), we have a complete picture how 
people interpret fl uency experiences. 
 Disentangling attribution and interpretation 
 Often, what we refer to as interpretation is referred to as one “attribution” step. 
We suggest that attribution and interpretation processes are separate rather than 
amalgamated within one process step. When amalgamated, the term attribution is 
used in a distal or ultimate sense, such as in “Fluency is attributed to the fame of 
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a person/the truth of a statement/the falseness of the statement…”. In this case, 
fl uency is not attributed to a specifi c mental process (e.g., perceiving a stimulus), 
but directly to a distal criterion that  causes fl uency, in the best sense of attribution 
as perceiving causes. That is, it is not the stimulus that is said to cause the experi-
ence, but the underlying property of the stimulus (e.g., frequency, truth, or fame). 
If attribution is understood in this ultimate way, it encompasses the interpretation 
step. This appears tempting from many experimental setups that mix attribution 
and interpretation, especially when the task settings presuppose attribution and 
interpretation (“Please indicate the word frequency” vs. “Please indicate your 
verbal ability”). While attributions of the experience place constraints on the kind 
of fl uency interpretations that are possible, we fi rmly believe it to be preferable 
to discern (a) attribution of perceived fl uency to a cause, and (b) interpretation of 
fl uency with respect to a criterion. 
 The conceptual need to keep these processes separated is shown when attrib-
uted fl uency is interpreted very differently. Specifi cally, although the fl uency 
source was clear in the experiments illustrating interpretation reviewed above 
(Unkelbach,  2006 ; Winkielman & Schwarz,  2001 ), participants used this fl uency 
differentially—something that is diffi cult to explain with a pure attribution processes. 
 Word frequency estimation again illustrates this point; let us assume that people 
retrieve words starting with “r” easily. In a single-step frame, when attribution and 
interpretation are amalgamated, the ultimate cause for this fl uent retrieval could 
be, for example, the absolute frequency of words starting with “r” in the English 
language (a distal criterion). In this case, fl uency can only be used to judge this 
distal criterion, because the attribution to the criterion constrains the interpretation. 
 In contrast, in a two-step frame, people fi rst attribute fl uency to the process 
of retrieving words starting with “r”, a very specifi c mental process. Only in a 
second step would individuals interpret retrieval fl uency as indicative of word 
frequency. The same fl uency experience could also be used to form many other 
judgments, including having a high verbal ability that facilitates word retrieval, 
or having recently read a list with “r” words. As the example illustrates, the attri-
bution of fl uency to a mental process in a two-step process does not (or at least 
less) constrain possible interpretations. Note that, compared to the one-step 
account which amalgamates attribution and interpretation, the present two-step 
account is much more in line with the empirical evidence on the many possible 
interpretations of one fl uency experience discussed above. 
 Model summary and open questions 
 We have discussed three steps of perceiving, attributing, and interpreting fl uency 
experiences, and provided a conceptual background (i.e., Brunswik’s lens-model) 
for how fl uency, as well as cognitive feelings and experiences in general, infl u-
ence judgments and decisions. Figure  2.2 presents a summary of these steps: 
First, some deviation or difference in processing is necessary to experience a 
cognitive feeling (here, a deviation from the general processing background). 
Second, the model assumes a unitary experience and the multitude of fl uency 
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effects comes about by the interpretation of that experience, or, in Brunswikian 
terms, by the ecological validity of the fl uency cue. This validity is conveyed by 
feedback from the actual judgments and decisions and the intercorrelation of the 
fl uency cue with other available cues; or, people have naïve theories about the 
meaning of the experience. Third, attribution and interpretation determine recip-
rocally the impact of experienced fl uency on subsequent judgments and deci-
sions. While attributions constrain the interpretations that are allowed, 
interpretations also feed back into the attribution process by making possible 
causes salient. Finally, consequences from the judgments feed back into the 
ecologically validity of the cue. If interpretations of fl uency lead constantly to 
wrong decisions, this interpretation must change or people should not use the cue 
anymore. Based on this summary, we now turn to what we believe to be intriguing 
open questions worth of future research. 
 Automaticity of the process? 
 A topic that is not featured in Figure  2.2 is the consciousness or automaticity 
issue. While the distinction of automatic and controlled, implicit and explicit, or 
conscious and unconscious processes has a long tradition in psychology (e.g., 
Chaiken & Trope,  1999 ), we avoided this point deliberately for the present 
discussion as it carries two problems: At present, there is no good criterion for 
defi ning consciousness in fl uency research that can be tested experimentally. This 
lack of a criterion is pointedly apparent when fl uency is localized at the “fringe 
of consciousness” (James,  1890 ; Reber, Wurtz, & Zimmermann,  2004 ), which 
we have incorporated as the threshold at which fl uency experiences are perceived. 
Without such a criterion and resulting theoretical implications, it is not useful to 
discuss whether the postulated processes are controlled or automatic, conscious 
or unconscious. Second, we believe that processes can move along the scale from 
unconscious to conscious. Attribution processes can be highly controlled, delib-
erate, and conscious—especially when the source of a strong experience is not 
clear. However, attribution can also be automatic and follow a default (Weiner, 
 1991 ). Similarly, people can interpret their experiences controlled and with 
effort. Imagine you are wearing prism glasses that distort your vision—in the 
beginning, you must correct for the distortion with great effort, but after a relative 
short time period, you adapt to the distortion and the correction becomes effort-
less and automatic (see Redding, Rossetti, & Wallace,  2005 , for an overview). 
Given these two problems, we believe it is not meaningful to incorporate assump-
tions about automaticity or consciousness into a fl uency model. 
 Positivity of the experience? 
 Another feature not included is the positivity of the experience. Many authors assume 
and present strong evidence that fl uency feels good (Garcia-Marques and colleagues, 
this volume; Winkielman & Cacioppo,  2001 ; see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 
 2004 , for a review), or leads to positive affect (Topolinski & Strack,  2009 ). 
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And across many judgments tasks, it seems that fl uency infl uences are biased 
toward the positive: statements are judged to be true, faces to be familiar, and 
people to be famous. The reverse is not often observed, and if so, under very 
specifi c circumstances; for example, when people are told that everything they 
heard before is false (Unkelbach & Stahl,  2009 , Exp. 2). However, whether the 
experience is inherently positive or neutral to begin with is of no consequence for 
the present model, as we have stressed the interpretation of the experience as one 
of the critical variables for fl uency effects. The model is about the meaning of the 
cue; whether this cue is generally positive or negative poses to begin with is 
largely inconsequential. On the contrary, if the fl uency experience is inherently 
positive, then it allows for new and testable hypotheses within this model; for 
instance, it should be easier to learn that fl uency correlates with positive distal 
variables than with negative distal variables. Interestingly, this is exactly what 
Mandler and colleagues (1987) found in the experiment described previously: 
while fl uency led participants to judge geometric shapes as preferable, brighter, 
and darker, the fl uency manipulation failed to infl uence judgments of disliking. 
 Another theoretical possibility is the path chosen by Weiner ( 1991 ) for his attribu-
tion theory of emotions. Supposedly, there is a very basic emotional positive-
negative dimension that is not subject to other cognitive processes. For any other 
emotion, though, attribution processes play a role. The same could be true for fl uency 
experiences, namely, that they can be used directly in judgments as a positive evalu-
ation, but for more complex tasks, the steps depicted in our model are necessary. 
However, at present, there is no data on such a theoretical conceptualization. 
 Another intriguing possibility is given by the overall faster processing of posi-
tive information (Unkelbach et al.,  2008 ), suggesting a reverse pathway from 
positivity to more fl uent processing. Thus, people might also learn that fl uency is 
highly correlated with positivity, leading to the observed positivity-fl uency 
effects. However, similar to the argument above, there is no data yet available to 
support this conception of a reversed fl uency-positivity pathway. 
 Fluency sources 
 We have stressed cognitive processes such as categorization, retrieval, or genera-
tion, as sources for fl uency experiences; however, as the overview by Alter and 
Oppenheimer ( 2009 ) shows, there are many ways to create and manipulate fl uency 
(for example, fl uency resulting from motor movements, see Topolinski, this 
volume). Such multiple sources of fl uency are compatible with our model, as long 
as the fl uency experience feeds into the judgmental process. Whether we can 
summarize all these experiences and manipulations under the fl uency label or more 
general, under the label of cognitive feelings, is a question we will discuss below. 
 Fluency and thinking styles 
 Another interesting aspect of the fl uency experience is omitted in Figure 2: 
fl uency also changes thinking styles (Oppenheimer,  2008 ). For example, Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre ( 2007 ) found that participants who experienced 
A general model of fluency effects in judgment and decision making  27
tasks as diffi cult switched from intuitive to more analytic thinking styles. The 
idea that fl uency also infl uences thinking styles, for example, analytic vs. intui-
tive reasoning, adds another layer to research on fl uency effects. At present, the 
interaction of such thinking styles with the present cue framework are not fully 
clear, and thus, we have omitted this interesting aspect from the model. We refer 
the interested reader to the chapters by Alter and Oppenheimer, as well as by 
Garcia-Marques and colleagues in this volume. 
 Theoretical restrictions 
 The way we present the model, it seems to account for most, if not all, fl uency 
effects on judgments and decisions. However, this poses a problem for the logic 
of science (Popper, 1959), because it might be impossible to falsify the model. 
A model that allows for everything has no scientifi c value for experimental 
psychology and applied issues. We believe this is not the case and we want to 
present the model’s theoretical restrictions for fl uency effects that are testable in 
experiments. First, the model clearly implies that there is only one attribution and 
interpretation of the experience. These two process steps explain the experience. 
Thus, it should not be possible that an easily-read statement is judged to be true 
and to be liked more. Fluency infl uences judgments of remembrance (“old/new”), 
liking (“good/bad”), or truth (“true/false”); but once such judgments are made, 
fl uency should not infl uence judgments about other distal variables. 
 Second, feedback should change the interpretation and this change should be 
specifi c to one context. People should be able to re-learn the usage of the cue (as 
shown in Unkelbach,  2006 ,  2007 ). And  if people learn that fl uency indicates, for 
example, a statement’s falseness, they should not generalize this to judgments of 
fame, that is, that fl uently processed names are non-famous. 
 Third, if other cues correlate negatively with the experience (e.g., when a 
known-to-be-unreliable witness gives a vivid and coherent testimony), the 
ecological validity or the cue weight determines the infl uence on the judgment/
decision. Such a situation is often used to illustrate dual-process models of 
 decision-making, but in the present framework, there is no need for such a dual-
ity. Imagine you have to choose between two cars; a friend tells you that car A is 
better, but you have a positive feeling about car B (e.g., the driving feels fl uent). 
Whether you choose A or B depends heavily on the cues’ validities—if your 
friend is a reliable expert for cars, you will follow her advice. Yet, if you have 
learned that following your feelings leads usually to good outcomes, you likely 
discard her opinion. These kinds of cue competitions are currently investigated in 
our research group and clearly illustrate that our proposed model is falsifi able. 
 A unitary construct? 
 We have saved one important point up to the end: It is the question if all the 
different manipulations used to cause fl uency, including repetition, color contrast, 
priming, logical consistency, and so forth really result in one unitary experience. 
The alternative hypothesis is that fl uency is not a unitary construct at all, but 
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that there are multiple distinct experiences that have an inherent meaning which 
infl uences judgments the same way affective feelings infl uence judgments (e.g., 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983). If a stimulus makes you happy, it is a good stimulus and 
if it makes you sad, it is a bad stimulus—the meaning is inherent in the feeling 
and does not need further interpretation to infl uence judgments. If cognitive feel-
ings are similar to emotional feelings, their meaning is distinct—it might be the 
set-up of all the experiments that leads to the illusion of one unitary experience. 
For example, Reisenzein ( 2000 ) discusses “surprise” as such a cognitive feeling 
that has a distinct meaning. So can we build our research on a unitary construct? 
 Aware of this question, Alter and Oppenheimer ( 2009 ) made a case for a 
unitary construct in an overview of methods to manipulate fl uency. The central 
premise was that: “…the degree to which diverse instantiations of fl uency 
converge to produce consistent outcomes […] implies that they share a common 
mechanism” (p. 227). However, this notion implies that if manipulation X leads 
to outcome Z, and manipulation Y also leads to outcome Z, X and Y must be the 
same. Logically, this inference is not valid and the evidence, albeit highly sugges-
tive, remained inconclusive. 
 However, there is experimental evidence that people have the same experience 
from different fl uency manipulations, and it is based on the idea of changing the 
interpretation of the experience. Remember that our model forbids generalizations 
of newly learned interpretations across different contexts (that is, from fl uency 
implying falseness to fl uency implying non-fame). Another generalization, 
however, must be possible: If people learn that fl uency implies statement falseness, 
and fl uency is a unitary construct, this must hold true independent from the specifi c 
statement fl uency manipulation. For the learning account, we already discussed the 
data by Unkelbach ( 2007 , Exp. 3), when participants learned that fl uency indicates 
falseness. During learning, fl uency varied due to color contrast. At test, fl uency 
varied due to repetition. Nevertheless, the learning effect occurred although differ-
ent fl uency manipulations were used. This result is most likely when both manipu-
lations infl uence the same experience, that is, the theoretical construct of fl uency. 
 A similar effect was shown by Unkelbach and Stahl ( 2009 ; Exp. 2; see also, 
Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl,  2011 ) using naïve theories. They fi rst 
showed that people process a set of factually true statements more fl uently than 
factually false statements. Then participants saw true and false statements in a 
presentation phase. After some delay, participants saw true and false statements; 
half of those were old and half were new. Importantly, instructions informed 
participants that  all statements from the presentation phase were false. Using this 
information, participants judged the old and easy-to-process statements as false, 
but also the new, factually true and easy-to-process statements. In other words, 
they applied the naïve theory about the meaning of fl uency due to prior exposure 
(“all false”) to fl uency due to factual truth; again, this is only likely when repeti-
tion and truth result in the same fl uency experience. 
 These experimental data are best explained by assuming that fl uency is a 
unitary construct. Accordingly, a general model of fl uency effects is a helpful 
requisite to understand the full scope of fl uency effects. 
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 Conclusion 
 We have presented a general model of fl uency effects in judgments and decisions, 
based on the lens-model by Brunswik ( 1955 ,  1957 ). This model conceptualizes 
fl uency as an experience resulting from ongoing cognitive processes (perception, 
retrieval, generation, etc.), and the experience is used as a cue in judgments 
and decisions. This conceptualization shows that we conceive fl uency both as a 
metacognitive experience (Koriat,  2008 ) and the infl uence on judgments and 
decisions as a perception-like process (Whittlesea,  1993 ). The important steps in 
this model are experiencing fl uency (i.e., when processes stand out as fi gures 
before a ground), attributing fl uency (i.e., when mental process are salient and 
applicable causes of the experience), and interpreting fl uency (i.e., when the 
process is given meaning by the context, learning history, or naïve theories and 
lay beliefs). 
 This model answers the three questions posed in the beginning that arise from 
standard fl uency research: First, fl uency is a unitary construct, thereby justifying 
a general model. Second, the processes of experiencing and attributing fl uency 
allow one unitary construct to infl uence diverse judgments and decisions. And 
third, the process of interpretation determines the direction of observed fl uency 
effects. By answering these questions, the model presents a comprehensive 
account of fl uency effects so far; it organizes the available research in one coher-
ent framework and clarifi es assumptions and pre-conditions. Most importantly, it 
allows for new and interesting hypothesis (cue competition, salience manipula-
tions, feedback learning), that will lead into further insight how the experience of 
thinking guides people’s judgments and decisions. 
 Note 
 1 In addition to purely cognitive experiences of fl uency, embodied sources of fl uency have 
come into focus within the last years. Topolinski (this volume) provides an overview of 
this particular fl uency source. 
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